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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some 
foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival 
interpretations. In particular I will ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a 
duality of evolutions and of ontology (the relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness 
of the classical world, which in the limit must be recovered from the former). I then 
concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to 
the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note 
interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum 
relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes).Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of 
becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important 
advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our 
experience of time is concerned. 
 
1. Introduction: the ongoing relativization of physical quantities 
 
According to Kuhn (1996, p. 85), a radical change in our physical worldview is not just 
due to the invention of a mathematical formalism or to new empirical information coming 
from novel experiments, but it also implies a thorough modification of the fundamental 
concepts with which we interpret the world of our experience. This is particularly evident in 
the scientific revolution ushered by Galileo (Koyré 1978), which consisted essentially in the 
discovery of the equivalence between uniform motion and rest, two notions that had always 
been sharply contrasted, but whose indistinguishability is essential to attribute our planet a 
counterintuitive state of motion.  
The same moral applies to Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (STR). Not by 
chance, Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (Rovelli 1996, 1998) draws 
inspiration from the latter theory, by correctly claiming that Einstein’s 1905 paper did not 
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change the existing physics, but provided a new interpretation of an already available 
formalism. As is well-known, this interpretation was obtained via a critique of an implicit 
conceptual assumption − absolute simultaneity − that is inappropriate to describe the physical 
world when velocities are significantly close to that of light. It is important to note that it was 
only thanks to the abandonment of such an assumption – that depends on the “manifest image 
of the world” (Sellars 1962), and in particular on that belief in a cosmically extended now that 
percolated in Newton’s Principia − that Einstein could postulate the two axioms of the theory, 
namely the invariance of the speed of light from the motion of the source and the universal 
validity of the principle of relativity. What is relevant here is to recall that not only do these 
axioms imply the relativization of velocity, already theorized by Galilei, but also that of the 
spatial and temporal intervals (separately considered), a fact that became particular clear with 
Minkowski (1908) geometrization of the theory.  
The historical theme of the relativization of quantities that were previously regarded as 
absolute is central also in Rovelli’s relational approach to quantum mechanics (RQM), whose 
metaphysical consequences, strangely enough, have not yet been explored in depth, despite 
the fact that in his interpretation, Rovelli proposes a much more radical relativization than that 
required by STR, namely the relativization of the possession of values (or definite 
magnitudes) to interacting physical systems. Rovelli’s relativization is more radical with 
respect to previous historical cases for at least two reasons.  
First, there is a sense in which he relativizes the very notion of “entity”, at least to the 
extent that the possession of some intrinsic properties is essential to the identity of an object 
and no entity can exist without an intrinsic identity. The identity of objects in the relational 
quantum world envisaged by Rovelli is purely relational or structural, at least for what 
concerns their state-dependent properties. Assertions like “relative to system O, system S has 
value q” according to Rovelli are in fact true only relative to O. For another system P who has 
not yet interacted with S+O, S could have no value at all. In STR, on the contrary, at least if 
one rejects, as nowadays is the case, the verificationist theory of meaning, the fact that “body 
B has length L in the inertial system S” holds for any possible inertial observer, even those 
that have no epistemic access to S.  
Second, while STR imposes a new absolute quantity that replaces the old ones now 
become relative (the four-dimensional Minkowski metric, or the spatiotemporal interval), 
Rovelli, as we will see, seems to have no new absolute quantity to propose: “In quantum 
mechanics different observers may give different accounts of the same sequence of events” 
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(1998, 4, italics added).2 However, how can we identify the “same” sequence of events within 
a relationist view of quantum mechanics? And furthermore, can a physical theory fail to 
possess at least some invariant elements that, together with the relevant symmetries, help us to 
identify what is objective or observer-independent? Can the whole universe be such an 
invariant? 
In this paper, I will try to answer these questions by analyzing some of the philosophical 
consequences of relational quantum mechanics (RQM), in particular by focusing on the 
conceptual issues surrounding the issue of the nature of physical entities in the quantum-to-
classical transition, and on the related question of the status of the whole (holism and 
monism) with respect to its parts. My main claim is that if Rovelli’s interpretation is correct or 
even plausible, then it does not legitimate the sort of priority monism advocated by Schaffer 
(2007)3, since its firm advocacy of locality has radical anti-holistic consequences.  
Here is the plan of the paper. In the second section, I will present in some more detailed 
Rovelli’ RMQ. In the third I will defend it from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify 
its philosophical implications vis à vis rival interpretations. In particular I will ask whether 
RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology (the 
relationality of quantum world and the intrinsicness of the classical world, which in the limit 
0  must be recovered from the former). In the fourth section I will concentrate on the 
pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of 
assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I will note some 
interesting consequences of RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum 
relativistic becoming (in flat spacetimes). Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of 
becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important 
advantage with respect to monistic views, at least as far as the possibility of explaining our 
experience of time is concerned. 
 
2 RQM in a nutshell, or interpreting Rovelli’s interpretation of QM 
 
Let me begin by summarizing my take at Rovelli’s RQM with the help of four slogans: 
1) go revisionary about the metaphysical assumptions of common sense 2) go dispositionalist 
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about isolated quantum systems, 3) go antirealist about the wave function and 4) stress the 
relationality of the identity of quantum systems. I will present these four points in turn. 
1) The first slogan presupposes a methodological and conceptual point. After 70 years 
of attempts at either changing the formalism of quantum mechanics (via nonlinear corrections 
of Schrödinger’s equation) or declaring the theory incomplete (by adding an ontology of local 
particles “guided” by a velocity field), RQM proposes a move that is similar to Einstein’s 
renunciation to the absoluteness of simultaneity, and truly revolutionary in its letting go 
important parts of our commonsensical world. In a word, Rovelli’s philosophical strategy can 
be summarized thus: don’t change the formalism of quantum mechanics, but change your 
manifest image of the world in accordance with the formalism and the experimental practice 
of the theory. In this respect, Rovelli’s revisionary interpretation is very similar to the 
Everett’s (1957) relative-state approach to quantum mechanics (not to the many-worlds 
version of it), but with some important differences to be noted below at point 3).  
According to RQM, the assumption of the manifest image that we need to give up in 
order to make sense of quantum mechanics is very deep-seated indeed in our cognitive make-
up since it is rather quite well-established in the classical world, a world to which we adapted 
in the course of evolution. The assumption in question is that objects and events inhabiting the 
physical world possesses intrinsic, non-purely relational properties. In Rovelli’s view, on the 
contrary, in the quantum world (and in the world simpliciter, to the effect that the classical 
world is reducible to the quantum world, a question that Rovelli does not treat explicitly but 
that will be important in the following) there are no observers’ independent properties, where 
“observer” here is any physical system, of any size (microscopical or macroscopical, quantum 
or classical) that is capable to carry information about a quantum system.4  
2) What does intrinsic mean here? A table has a shape, and shapes are prima facie 
intrinsic properties, properties that is, that the objects in question would have even if they 
were “lonely”, hat is, the only objects existent in the universe (Lewis 1983a)5. Likewise the 
properties charge or mass appear to be intrinsic; our weight is instead relational, since it 
depends on whether, for instance, we are on the Moon or here on Earth. The notion of 
“intrinsic” enter in Rovelli’s interpretation because RQM can be formulated in two related 
ways: i) either it does not make sense to talk about a quantum non-interacting system (and if 
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5 “The intrinsic properties of something depend only on that thing; whereas the extrinsic properties of something 
may depend, wholly or partly, on something else. If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfect 
duplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in different surroundings will differ in their extrinsic 
properties.” (Lewis 1983a: 111-2) 
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this were our reading, his position would be very close to Bohr’s), or ii) to put it more 
metaphysically, non-interacting quantum systems have no intrinsic properties, except 
dispositional ones. In other words, such systems have dispositions to correlate with other 
systems/observers O, that manifest themselves as the possession of definite properties relative 
to those Os. This means that it is only when a quantum system S interacts with another 
physical system O (“observer”) that O can attribute definite properties to S: for another 
observer P, who has not yet interacted with S, S has no definite properties. If we interpret 
Rovelli’s view by adopting the language of dispositions or powers, then all quantum objects 
have intrinsic dispositions to correlate and exchange information with observers, but the 
manifestation of such dispositions depends on the observer in question. When talking about 
dispositions, we typically need to specify a stimulus for the disposition to manifest itself (say, 
striking a match) and the manifestation of the disposition (the match catching fire, an event). 
In our case, the stimulus for S’ disposition to manifest itself is the particular O it interacts 
with, while the manifestation is the definite event that is the byproduct of the interaction.  
It could be remarked that in formulating RQM we should limit ourselves to claiming − 
semantically, or in the formal mode − that descriptions of isolated quantum systems are 
meaningless or lack definite truth-value. Rather than formulating the theory ontologically or 
in the material mode, we should refrain from assuming that RQM refers to the state-dependent 
features of quantum objects as real, concrete dispositions.6 Rovelli and Laudisa do not 
explicitly distinguish between these two modes, and by mixing them in a single sentence, 
seem to regard them as equivalent: “The physical world is thus seen as a net of interacting 
components, where there is no meaning to the state of an isolated system. A physical system 
(or, more precisely, its contingent state) is reduced to the net of relations it entertains with the 
surrounding systems, and the physical structure of the world is identified as this net of 
relationships.” (Rovelli and Laudisa 2007, p.1, my emphasis).  
Since I am interested in the metaphysical intimations of RQM, in this paper I will 
explore the second (ontological) mode of presentation of the theory. So I will assume without 
further ado that claiming that ‘a proposition concerning an isolated quantum system is 
meaningless’ entails, or is equivalent to, claiming that ‘the system has no intrinsic, state-
dependent properties but rather possesses just dispositional properties’. This move has at least 
two clear advantages. The first is as follows: to the extent that mass, charge and spin, that 
typically regarded as intrinsic, state-independent properties, can also be regarded as 
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dispositional – and there are good reasons to take this stance −,7 we gain a unified, 
dispositionalist account of both kinds of states. The second advantage is to favor and even 
justify an entity-realistic account (see Hacking 1983) also of isolated quantum systems and 
not just of interacting ones.8 This aspect, I take it, distinguishes RQM from the so-called 
“Ithaca interpretation of QM”, according to which in QM only correlations are real, and relata 
aren’t (see Mermin 1998). Rovelli need not deny with the instrumentalists the existence of 
isolated quantum system: qua carriers of dispositions, such systems can be regarded as real as 
the table on which I am typing. “Going dispositionalist” as the second slogan recommends 
ensures both the reality of the isolated systems and the lack of definiteness of state-dependent 
properties. In a word, and summarizing the second slogan, I will regard isolated quantum 
systems as endowed with an intrinsic propensity (a probabilistic disposition) to reveal certain 
definite values of physical magnitudes by interacting with any kind of physical system. 
Whether propensities are a reasonable interpretation of the formal notion of probability is 
better left to another paper.  
3) The third slogan helps us to distinguish RQM from Everett’s relative-state type of 
formulations. A first difference is that in Rovelli’s view there are real physical interactions 
between systems and observers, while in Everettian approaches the only physical evolution 
that is admitted is Schrödinger’s linear and deterministic one, plus a recourse to decoherence, 
which in any case preserves entangled states but just makes them inaccessible to local 
observers. The main point is that in Everettian approaches a universal quantum state is 
presupposed as existent; on the contrary, RQM denies any ontological role to the wave 
function and to the quantum state and turns them into predictive, merely instrumental devices. 
In RQM, the wave function does not stand for something real, but simply records the 
probabilistic outcomes of previous interactions between systems of a certain kind.  
Antirealism about the wave function has its advantages, which will discussed in the next 
section. For now, it should be stressed that the “beables” of RQM,9 its fundamental or 
primitive ontological posits,10 are those quantum events that are the manifestation of the 
propensity of isolated systems to reveal certain values, relative to other well-identified 
systems. A Stern-Gerlach apparatus revealing spin up is a quantum event. It is important to 
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 For a dispositional treatment of mass and charge, see Dorato and Esfeld (2013). For a dispositionalist approach 
to the metaphysics of laws, see Bird (2007). 
8
  
9
 The term beable is in Bell (1993, p. 174), to be contrasted with observable. 
10
 For this notion, see Allori et al (2008), who however use it in a rather different philosophical framework: the 
idea that is appropriated here is to identify for any physical theory what exists in spacetime as fundamental. 
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quote from the following passage, since the language in which the theory is stated 
(‘actualization’, ‘coming into being’) seems to confirm the dispositionalist interpretation of 
RQM offered above, as well as making room for a view of becoming that will be broached in 
the last section: “the real events of the world are the "realization" (the "coming to reality", the 
"actualization") of the values q, q′, q″, … in the course of the interaction between physical 
systems. This actualization of a variable q in the course of an interaction can be denoted as 
the quantum event q.” (Laudisa and Rovelli 2007, ibid.).  
4) The fourth slogan helps us to realize how the identity of a sequence of events, i.e., the 
processes that characterize the primitive ontology of the theory, is relative to the different 
observers. With obvious notation, suppose that at time t1 the state of the quantum system S is:  
SS
S    
1
22
 
 
Suppose that at time t2 a physical system O interacts with S and that, relative to O, the 
spin of S is ‘up’, that is,
S
 According to the relational interpretation, the state of S for O 
evolves from 
SO
ready   at time t1 to 
SOS

/
 at time t2. The index S/O denote the 
relativity of the properties of the system S to O. If another physical systems P has not 
interacted with S+O yet, at time t2 and relatively to P, the description of the combined S+O 
system will not assume any definiteness of results, but will rely on the linearity of the 
evolution of the Ψ function. This means that according to P the state at t2 is a superposition of 
O observing spin up with S being spin up, plus O observing being spin down and S being spin 
down, with the same coefficients as before. In this sense RQM applies the quantum formalism 
also to classical systems. For simplicity, let me quote Brown:  
“the state of S+O for P is
SOSOPSO
downup  
/
 [at time t2]. According to the 
Malus–Born law, the probability that P will find the state at [a later time] t3 to be 
SO
up   
(electron spin-up and O indicating ‘up’) is |α|2, and the probability of 
SO
down   is ||
2
. So, 
as von Neumann taught us, the probabilities agree. But notice: if we are to take RQM 
seriously, nothing said so far prevents it from being the case that P finds |down>O |↓>S at
 
t3, 
and thus S being spin-down for P, even though S was spin-up for O!” (Brown 2009, p. 690).  
Of course, given the relativity of states to observers, this is not a contradiction, since 
there are two interactions involved; after a third direct interaction between S and P, were they 
human observers, they would agree on the meta-statements: (i) “the interaction between S and 
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O produced: ‘S was up for O and S’s spin was up’”, while “the interaction between S+O and 
P produced a state that, relative to P, was: ‘S was down for O and S’s spin was down’.” 
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    3 Five  objections to RMQ 
 
 
In order to clarify the consequences of RQM’s antirealistic stance about the wave 
function, as well as the relationalist/dispositionalist accounts of the state-dependent properties 
in quantum mechanics, four critical remarks are in order. The first concerns the explanatory 
power of RQM (3.1), the second the overcoming of typical dualisms of the standard 
interpretation (3.2), the third the issue of the relationship between RQM and spacetime 
relationism (3.3) the fourth the relationship between relational and invariant elements in RQM 
(3.4) and the fifth concerning the completeness of RQM (3.5). The fifth objection will be 
discussed in the next section.  
I should specify at the outset that here I will not conclude that RQM is immune to all of 
these objections, but I will try to answer them as best as I can, by pointing out that RQM can 
solve many extant interpretive problems of quantum mechanics. Not only will these critical 
remarks help me to compare the merits of RQM vis à vis the other main interpretations of the 
non-relativistic formalism, but my reply to each of them will at the same time justify both the 
plausibility of Rovelli’s view and my antimonistic use of it in the last two sections. 
3.1) First, it could be objected that there must be a physical reason, a deeper 
explanation, as to why the square modulus of the wave function (or simply the Born rule) is so 
effective in giving us accurate predictions of measurement interactions.11 Shouldn’t RQM 
offer an explanation as to why interactions between an entangled system S and an observer O 
manifest quantum events with definite magnitudes with exactly the probability prescribed by 
the theory? 
To this criticism RQM can reply that, temporarily at least, the notion of “physical 
interaction” between systems and observers has to be regarded as primitive: in this way, any 
such question can be blocked as meaningless, or as presupposing a different interpretation. 
Since any interpretation of a formalism must start from somewhere, that is, it must regard 
certain facts, concepts or events as explanatorily fundamental or primitive, this first objection 
loses some of its force.  
A critic may object that this is the main conceptual problem of non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics, and that by declaring the notion of interaction between systems as primitive and 
unexplainable in physical terms we sweep the dust under the rug. However, a defender of 
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RQM need not deny that it might be desirable in the future to try to explain the success of 
Born’s rule,12 but could simply note, at the same time, that as of now, by accepting the 
relationality of quantum mechanics, we ought to accept it as a brute fact about the world. 
Many effective predictions in quantum theory, take Feynman’s diagrams as an example, do 
not presuppose a realistic stance about say, the fact that the particles depicted in the diagrams 
have a well-defined trajectory. The standard understanding of them is that they are used to 
keep track of, and simplify, various difficult calculations in quantum field theories (Brown 
1996).13 Predictive success, as Ptolemy’s astronomy well demonstrates, by itself is not 
sufficient for endorsing a realistic stance about some calculating device that allows the 
prediction. Of course, in the case of the Ptolemaic system, explaining certain coincidences 
was a major step in formulating the new Copernican astronomy, but the situation in quantum 
physics at the moment seems different: any gain in explanatory force (as in bohmian 
mechanics or dynamical collapse models) must be accompanied by a clear independent 
evidence for the postulation of the explanandum. It is highly desirable that such evidence be 
gained in the future, but at the moment we ought to recognize that it is still not available. 
Notice, furthermore, two more arguments siding with Rovelli’s antirealistic view about 
the wave function. First, the contrary view would commit one to the existence of an 3n-
dimensional configuration space where the wave function lives in a system with n particles, 
and the daunting task in this case would amount to recovering good old four-dimensional 
space from the reified configuration space (Albert 1996 thinks that such a task is feasible at 
least in principle).  
Second, the celebrated paper by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (2012) in Nature Physics − 
which tries to prove that the wave function is more than mere information − assumes 
something that RMQ would not accept, namely that isolated systems have well-defined 
magnitudes (I guess this is what the ambiguous term “real physical state” in the following 
quotation really amounts to): “The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a 
system has a `real physical state' not necessarily completely described by quantum theory, but 
objective and independent of the observer. This assumption only needs to hold for systems 
                                                 
12
 The origin of the Born rule dates back to Einstein’s Gespensternfeld: “In the early 1920’s, Einstein, in his 
unpublished speculations, proposed the idea of a “Gespensterfeld” or a ghost field which determines the 
probability for a light-quantum to take a definite path. In these speculations, the ghost field gives the relation 
between a wave field and a light-quantum by triggering the elementary process of spontaneous emission. The 
directionality of the elementary process is fully described by the will (dynamical properties) of the ghost field.” 
W´odkiewicz (1995). Born interpreted the ghost field, whose intensity according to Einstein was linked to the 
direction of the light quantum, as a probability field. 
13
 But see Meynell 2008 for a contrary opinion and Wüthrich 2010 for an historical reconstruction. 
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that are isolated, and not entangled with other systems” (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 2012, p. 
475). While this second remark is not a positive argument in favor of RQM, it shows at least 
that some no-go theorems against quantum relationalism are not decisive.14 
 
3.2) The second criticism addresses the question whether RQM is really successful in 
overcoming the various types of dualisms of textbook-quantum-mechanics that many 
interpretations purport to eliminate. I am referring here to (i) a dualism between conscious 
observers on the one hand and any other physical system on the other that is capable to keep 
some information about a quantum system after a physical interaction, (ii) a dualism between 
quantum systems and classical apparatuses (Bell 1993, p. 176), (iii) a dualism between two 
different kinds of temporal evolutions (a reversible and deterministic one, preserving 
superposition and a probabilistic, irreversible and possibly non-linear one, implied in 
measurement interactions, or S-O correlations), (iv) a dualism between the macroscopic 
classical world endowed with apparently intrinsic properties and the microscopic world 
characterized by merely dispositional or relational properties). While such four types of 
dualisms are deeply related, it is better if they are discussed separately. 
(i) At least programmatically, RQM tries to eliminate von Neumann’s recourse to 
conscious observers in the foundations of quantum mechanics: “By using the word “observer” 
I do not make any reference to conscious, animate, or computing, or in any other manner 
special, system. I use the word “observer” in the sense in which it is conventionally used in 
Galilean relativity when we say that an object has a velocity “with respect to a certain 
observer”. The observer can be any physical object having a definite state of motion” (Rovelli 
1996, 3).  
Let us grant that the interaction between the “observer” O and the system S does not 
require the presence of consciousness. However, some terms carelessly used by Rovelli and 
Smerlack may create some trouble for a decisive overcoming of the dualism between 
conscious and inanimate physical systems. We are told that the physical system O interacting 
with a quantum entity S must be capable of storing information about S.15 ‘Information’, 
however, is an ambiguous term, which prima facie stands for epistemic states of conscious 
observers. In this way, consciousness would be reintroduced from the door after having been 
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 For a general, critical survey of no-go theorems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, see Laudisa (2013). 
15 “If A can keep track of the sequence of her past interactions with S, then A has information about S, in the 
sense that S and A’s degrees of freedom are correlated. (Rovelli and Smerlack 1996, p.2) 
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dropped it outside the window. In other words, even if interpreted technically à la Shannon, 
the problem for a philosophical reading of RQM is − exactly as is the case with probability, 
which has an axiomatic, purely formal treatment too − that we don’t know what information 
is. There is a syntactic and a semantic sense of it, so that more care is needed to make sure 
that “information” is reduced to a merely physical correlation.  
In a word, RQM should avoid any semantical, epistemic reading of “information”, as 
well as talks of subjective probability (pace Rovelli and Smerlack 2007, note 7), which also 
refers by definition to epistemic states of agents. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I 
propose that these two notions be replaced by, respectively, interaction Hamiltonian between 
S and O and objective, mind-independent dispositional probabilities (propensities). In fact, 
“storing information” ought to be regarded as a symmetric physical correlation between S and 
O, so that also S stores information about O and not just conversely. An interaction 
Hamiltonian, by expressing a correlation, is symmetric between S and O, and can play this 
role in a physically genuine sense. Given that the notion of interaction is primitive, it should 
not be analyzed in terms of causal notions, as if a certain type of causal processes had 
occurred between the S and O.  
(ii) As to the second form of dualism, Rovelli adds that any contextual distinction 
between a classical realm and a quantum realm, needed in particular by Bohr’s 
interpretation,16 in RQM is banned. The most significant distinction between Bohr’s view and 
RQM is therefore that any sort of contextual dualism between the classical and the quantum is 
forbidden. In RQM everything is quantum since also classical object are subject − as we have 
seen above and we are about to clarify in some more details in (iii) − to the superposition 
principle.17 Bohr, on the contrary, needs a classical realm for detecting measurement results 
that are not subject to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, and therefore also a classical 
spacetime. Something that Rovelli’s approach to quantum gravity rejects programmatically 
(2007). 
                                                 
16
 The contextuality of the distinction between classical and quantum objects that is essential to Bohr’s 
interpretation of QM is evident in Bohr (1949) when, discussing the thought experiment proposed by Einstein 
and involving a double-slit macroscopic screen suspended with springs, Bohr treats the classical slit as a 
quantum system subject to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation between position and momentum. For a defense of 
Bohr’s contextualism and a critical attitude toward “quantum fundamentalism” (according to which everything is 
subject to QM), see Zinkernagel (2010).  
17 “All systems are equivalent: Nothing distinguishes a priori macroscopic systems from quantum systems. If the 
observer  O can give a quantum description of the system S, then it is also legitimate for an observer P to give a 
quantum description of the system formed by the observer O.” (Rovelli, 1998, ibid) 
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(iii) Additional questions about the measurement problem are raised by the dualism-of- 
evolution’s objection mentioned above. We have just established that any physical system O 
can be treated as a quantum system. But then how can a system S − that is in an objectively 
superposed state, and shows real interference − show definite properties relative to another 
quantum system O after an interaction with it if we don’t presupposes two different kind of 
evolutions, one for system-systems and one for systems-“observers”? What are, precisely, 
Brown’s “two types of relations” in the following quotations?: “Rovelli’s account admits a 
distinction between types of relations: on the one hand, there are system–system relations, 
and, on the other, there are system–observer relations. System–system relations are 
interactions among elements of the system that can become entangled quantum-mechanical 
correlations. System–observer relations are interactions between the system and observer such 
that a property of the system becomes actualized for the observer.“ (Brown 2009, p. 685).  
Since these two types of relations must be referring to two different physical evolutions 
− one of which (S-O interactions) remains unexplained because is regarded as primitive −, 
rather than unification, RQM seems to reproduce that annoying dualism in the foundations of 
quantum physics that is already familiar from standard formulations of the theory. It is true, of 
course, that thanks to the relationism of the theory, these two evolutions do not contradict 
each other, but Rovelli seems in any case to need a principled distinction between systems S 
and physical inanimate “observers” O, which he denies to have to rely on, a fact that would 
cause a collapse of RQM on Bohr’s contextualism.  
There are two ways out from this conundrum, the second of which is more promising. 
The first consists in denying, à la Everett, that there is any physical interaction between S and 
O, and insist on the fact that the only real physical evolution is Schrödinger’s linear and 
deterministic one. However, this cannot be his position, since the definiteness of outcomes, 
the actualization of a quantum event, would either have to be either a merely local 
phenomenon as in Everettian’s decoherence approaches, or utterly impossible, or a simple 
illusion.  
As far as the second way out is concerned, some caution is needed. On the one hand, 
denying the referential power of, or some kind of reality to, those interference effects 
described by the unitary evolution of Schrödinger’s equation, when referred to microscopic 
realms, is implausible. On the other hand, however, the dualism of evolution referred to by 
Brown is attenuated by the decisive fact that, according to Rovelli, Schrödinger’s 
superposition-preserving equation is a description of the evolution of probabilities of 
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measurement that does not refer to any primitive ontology. Recall that in RQM the wave-
function is merely a bookkeeping device, while the only reality is given by events that are the 
outcome of interactions or mutual information between two different systems. With this 
instrumentalist reading of the wave-function, the dualism in evolution is at least not 
straightforwardly reflected in a dualistic ontology, despite the fact that interference effects 
must be regarded as real.  
In a word, while this dualism of equations (one of which, the so-called Born rule, is a 
mere rule of thumb) seems an ineliminable and in my opinion undesirable consequence of 
RQM, it is possible to reformulate it in such a way as to lessen its negative conceptual impact 
(from the empirical, practical viewpoint obviously RQM has no difficulties whatsoever). If 
one understands the consequence of relationism, one realizes that the dualism of evolution is 
relative to two different “observers”.18 Suppose that our system S interacts with observer O. 
Relative to O, S has definite values, so that the evolution involving S and O is the interactive 
one that − relative to O and to any observers, even those who have not yet interacted with 
S+O − has to be regarded as primitive for the reasons given above.  
Let us call such an evolution E1. Consider now another observer P: we have seen that if 
P knows that S and O have interacted, relative to P, the composite system S+O has an 
indefinite value, no matter how classical O is. It follows that the very same interaction 
between S and O is described by P with Schrödinger’s equation, which preserves 
superpositions and entangled states. Let us call this linear evolution E2. Clearly, since E1 
they stand for two physically real processes with the caveat specified above, but the 
undesirable dualism of evolutions that is present in standard formulation of QM is attenuated 
by the fact that RQM denies any correlation-independent description of the physical world. It 
is true that the overarching aim of physics (and science) is unification, but “you cannot always 
get what you want” (Mick Jagger’s famous theorem):19 if a plausible interpretation of a 
fundamental physical theory like RQM requires a form of relationism, then there can be as 
much unification as the theory affords, at least for the time being. 
Another way to put this point is to claim that the dualism is not between systems and 
observers, but rather between physical systems that are internal to the interaction and those 
that are external to it. Since the entanglement between any two systems S and O (the latter of 
which is an “observer” exactly as the former is to the latter) is kept for any other system P that 
                                                 
18
 The scare quote reminds us once again that “observer” stands for any physical system endowed with a state of 
motion. 
19
 I owe this pun to Juliusz Doboszewski. 
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has not yet interacted with S+O, the composite S+O is to be regarded as external to the 
interaction S+O, so that the entanglement between them is broken only for observers P that 
interact with S+O and are therefore “internal” to the correlation.20 Importantly, the external/ 
internal difference is indexical, since its reference varies with the context, in the sense in 
which now and here are indexicals. 
In sum, a residue of dualism is necessary in order to account for the measurable 
interference between states in superposition on the one hand, and the fact that we observe 
definite result on the other. Such a dualism, however, does not seem fatal to Rovelli’s RQM: 
it is not an objection to the theory, it is the theory, which is based on the experimental 
evidence of the measurability of interference effects on the one hand (which calls for linear 
evolutions) and the obvious fact that measurements have outcomes. I would dare to add that 
without this particular form of “dualism” (entanglement-preserving linear evolution and 
relational property-definiteness obtained via a physical interaction) RQM would not be 
coherent. “Relativization” or the indexing of measurements to “observers” is a way to avoid 
the contradictions between two descriptions of the same process, as is always the case with 
relational views of the world: as Plato insisted, the same man can be short and tall relatively 
to two different persons. 
(iv) the dualism of the intrinsicness of the classical and the relationality of the quantum 
entails two strategies: either claim that also the classical world is through and through 
relational (Dipert 1997), or defend a dispositionalist view of both the quantum and the 
classical world (where all properties are intrinsic dispositions), much in the spirit sketched in 
the previous section. Here I will not insist on this aspect, since the reduction of the classical to 
the quantum realm is an open problem for all interpretations. 
 
3.3) The third possible criticism mentioned at the beginning of the present section (the 
relationship between RQM and spacetime relationism) depends on the following fact. Within 
RQM is constituted by the collection of all definite quantum events, which, in their turn can 
be regarded the outcomes of interactions between different systems. It then becomes relevant 
to compare Rovelli’s quantum relationism with that spacetime relationism that he also 
                                                 
20
 See also Rovelli (1998, 19).  Dalla Chiara refers to the internal/external relation in terms of the (more logical)  
object/meta-object distinction: "any apparatus, as a particular physical system, can be an object of the theory. 
Nevertheless, any apparatus which realizes the reduction of the wave function is necessarily only a 
metatheoretical object " (Dalla Chiara 1977, p. 340). This is a way of claiming that the theory cannot explain the 
reduction of the wave function. 
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advocates in the foundations of spacetime theories. One could of course maintain that 
relationism in QM is logically independent of relationism about spacetime, but it could be 
claimed that QM needs in all cases an absolutist, non-relationist understanding of positions in 
space, and therefore a non-relationist account of at least one state-dependent magnitude of 
quantum systems (namely space, and possibly also time). If this were the case, RQM would 
be inconsistent. 
As a matter of fact, it has indeed been argued that QM in general needs a non-relationist 
account of positions and times, as the locations and times of measurement outcomes must be 
regarded in a subtantivalist fashion (see Weinstein 1999). Weinstein plausibly argues that 
spacetime relationism is motivated by the insistence that absolute time and positions are 
unobservable. Exactly as in the present context, also relationalism in the spatiotemporal 
context is motivated by, and is selective toward, what is directly observable, because it refers 
to physical relations between two objects or properties: “being one meter away from each 
other” is a relational property of two objects (Weinstein 1999, 67).  
Weinstein’s arguments in favor of the fact that quantum mechanics in general requires 
an absolute space and time are grounded on the absence of a quantum theory of measurement 
and the consequent need to rely on classical observers or apparata placed in well-defined 
location at well-definite times. Even for Everett, Weinstein claims, positions of objects maybe 
relative to positions of the measuring apparatus, but “such positions will be positions in 
absolute space” (Weinstein 1999, p. 72).  
As a reply to this remark, note that Weinstein’s complaint is similar to the one that we 
voiced before: it is the lack of a precise quantum theory of measurement (and of any 
“observation” realized by any physical system) that might seem to force us to consider 
observables as referring to properties of classical objects in absolute locations in space and 
time. But if we accept with Rovelli that the interaction between subsystems of the universe is 
a primitive notion, we don’t need to presuppose classical objects located in an absolute space 
and time: also the positions of physical systems is a consequence of their interaction, and is 
therefore relative. It follows that in RQM an object S will have a position s with respect to 
observer O and another position, or no definite position at all, with respect to another observer 
P who has not interacted with S+O. Pace Weinstein, and relatively to the context of RQM, 
relationism about positions (and times, as we will see in 5) is defensible, at least to the extent 
that what is observable within Rovelli’s interpretation is only the relative position of objects 
which have actually interacted and therefore possess reciprocal information. 
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3.4) The fourth critical remark that needs to be raised at this point is contained in the 
following question: “which are the invariants of RQM?” It might be thought that a theory 
without some invariant or absolute (non-relational) element lacks a desirable component of 
any physical theory.21 The special theory of relativity, for example, which is the point of 
departure for Rovelli’s proposal, introduces new absolutes (the Minkowski metric) while 
relativizing spatial and temporal intervals taken separately, and regards relations between 
observers and physical objects as invariant: it is true for all observers that “in frame F the 
length of the ruler R is L”.  
Brown looks for similar absolute relations also in RQM: “...in relational quantum 
mechanics, the physical relations between systems remain invariant. (O and P agree about the 
relation of O to S, but at t2 they disagree about the determinacy of each).” (Brown 2009, p. 
693). Here I must disagree with Brown. While he is right in insisting that both O and P can 
correctly claim that “there is a physical interaction between O and S” (that is, the type-relation 
between O and S exists abstractly for both O and P), the token, concrete relation, the way the 
abstract relation is exemplified for the two observers, is different: relative to O, S’spin is up, 
while relative to P, O may find spin down. In other words, the absolute, invariant elements of 
RQM according to Brown are simply given by the fact that, when information allows 
observers to claim that certain systems interact with certain observers, there is a physical 
interaction taking place between systems and observers; but this is clearly a very weak sort of 
absoluteness, amounting to the view that some physical systems interact with each other.22 
The agreement is only achievable when S and P interact and agree that relatively to O, S’s 
spin was up, while according to P, O measured spin down or up, whatever the result was. 
Let us look elsewhere for other possible “invariances” that Rovelli might need for its 
coherence but that don’t contradict RQM. A possible candidate is the meta-statement or the 
meta-constraint of the theory, namely that quantum systems have properties only relative to 
observers. This is obviously not a statement of a particular observer, but a principle or 
constraint that is valid for all observers and for any possible interaction between systems and 
observers, akin to the special relativistic prescription of writing laws, or putting forward 
physical descriptions, that obey the relativity principle and are therefore Lorentz invariant.  
                                                 
21
 van Fraassen asks “How can we characterize these systems, in ways that are not relative to something else? 
That remains crucial to the understanding of this view of the quantum world.” (Van Fraassen 2009, p.2 of the 
manuscript). 
22
 After all, that no absolute relations between the perspective of O and that of P is to be found is one of 
Rovelli’s starting point (1998, 8). 
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Note that the above meta-principle is not an objection to RQM, as Bitbol claims within 
his neokantian reading of RQM,23 because it does not presuppose a “non-located observer” or 
a non-indexed attribution of a property to a system from God’s eye point of view or a Kantian 
transcendental principle. The constraint, as such, is a sort of meta-law for any quantum 
mechanical law that can be stated in the object language, a constraint, that is, on how any 
possible quantum description should be given, in the same sense in which the relativity 
principle is a meta-law for mechanical and electromagnetical laws.  
A third invariant element of RQM is constituted, as noted by van Fraassen, by the 
transition probabilities for the two observers O and P (the modulus square of the coefficients 
a and b in the example above), which are identical for both. Being calculated in accordance 
with the mathematical apparatus of QM, the element also defines an algebra of observables: 
not by chance, these are structural, mathematical invariants of the theory.  
Two additional element of absoluteness in RQM are the eigenvalue-eigenvector link, 
that Rovelli retains from traditional QM, and the fact that whenever a correlation is 
established between any two systems S and O, there is coherence between what it is measured 
in S and the properties of O that allow detection. In simpler words, while it is possible for P to 
find out that O has observed down and S’s spin is down while O has observed that spin is up 
and S’ spin is up, it is never the case that P finds that O has observed up (down) and the spin 
of S is down (up, respectively).  
In a word, the above elements of invariance are sufficient to ensure robustness to RQM 
without destroying the coherence of its relationist take on the world. Since the fifth objection 
will be dealt with in the next section, we can start to discuss some metaphysical consequence 
of RQM 
                                                 
23 "l’interprétation relationnelle suppose encore, bien qu’assez discrètement, une forme d’absolutisation: 
l’absolutisation du point de vue à partir duquel sont établies ses propres méta-descriptions. En allant jusqu’au 
bout de la perspective tracée, on devrait se demander pour qui vaut la métadescription d’un système en relation 
avec un appareil et un observateur, acceptée jusque-là comme donnée" (Bitbol 2007, p. 11 of the manuscript). 
According to Bitbol, this is a sort of Kantian condition of possibility for having knowledge of the quantum 
world. 
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4 The antimonistic consequences of RQM 
 
In the first section I promised to bring to bear QM on monism, a philosophical view 
which, from Parmenides to Spinoza, and from to Hegel to Bradley, has a long tradition in the 
history of Western philosophy. Does quantum mechanics per se side with monism, given its 
allegedly holistic nature? (Hughes 1989, Healey 1989)  
Since one cannot answer this question without presupposing an interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, in this section I will try to tackle it by choosing RQM as a consistency 
test. In the previous section I argued that, despite its difficulties, RQM is a plausible 
interpretation of the theory. Consequently, my choice is not unreasonable, especially if put in 
the conditional form: if RQM is a reasonable interpretation of QM, what happens to monism?.  
It could be objected that apriori metaphysical positions like monism cannot be 
confronted with physical theories that are programmatically interpreted in an instrumentalistic 
way. However, RQM per se is not at all describable as a purely positivistic, instrumentalistic 
or antimetaphysical interpretation24: as such, it qualifies for a confrontation with a 
metaphysical theory like holism. It is not just RMQ’s advocacy of entity realism that matters 
here, but also its metaphysics of relations, denying any intrinsic properties to physical 
systems.25 
What is monism? According to Schaffer’s useful distinction (2010), there are in any 
case two kinds of monism, one more radical and the other more reasonable but still 
interesting, that he himself defends. While the former kind, existence monism, claims that the 
Universe has no parts since only the whole exists, priority monism grants the non-monist or 
the pluralist the existence of parts, but holds at the same time “that the whole is prior to its 
parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanations dangling 
downward from the One” (Schaffer 2010, p. 31). What kind of support, if any, could RQM 
provide to these two kinds of monism?  
First of all, note that holism and monism should not be confused: one can have holistic, 
that is non-separable, components of a whole (think of two particles in a singlet state) which 
are, however, only a separable part of the whole universe. In this case we could have holism 
                                                 
24
 Recall that RQM is realist about the existence of quantum entities, even though it is antirealist about the wave 
function. 
25
 With the proviso that this statement is restricted to state-dependent properties. 
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without monism. Secondly, in RQM there are relata or quantum systems S, even though it is a 
primitive relation created by an interaction between “indefinite” relata S and O’s that assigns 
definite values to the parts S: such a relationist position is fully compatible with priority 
monism. There is no reason why relata (quantum systems) with state-dependent indefinite 
magnitudes ought to be regarded as non-existent. Is RQM compatible with existence monism? 
One might be even tempted to claim that the only determinate object in Rovelli’s RQM is the 
quantum universe (thereby endorsing priority monism), but, as we will see, this temptation 
must be resisted. 
Consider the following three misleading arguments in favor of priority monism that 
might be regarded as following from RQM: 
4.1) There are many ways to partition the quantum universe, and each «cut» between 
system and observer is fully arbitrary, in the same sense in which it is arbitrary the choice of 
an inertial system to describe the evolution of a system in Minkowski spacetime: in STR what 
is intrinsically real, however, is the whole, the block universe, all events in Minkowski 
spacetime. An analogue of this kind of invariance should hold also in RQM and one could 
claim that in RQM the universe (the whole, or the One, to use Schaffer’s term) is what it is, 
and possesses the definite magnitudes that it has, independently of any relation to anything 
else. 
4.2) the second argument in favor of the claim that priority monism is evidence for 
RQM is related to the first: it cannot be meaningless to refer to the quantum state of the 
universe, otherwise no quantum cosmology would be possible! 
4.3) the quantum state of the universe is entangled, and this pushes toward monism 
(Esfeld 1999, Schaffer 2010): everything is interrelated, but the relation of entanglement 
between the relata is not supervenient on the parts entering the relation (Teller 1986, Healey 
1989). This means that there can be particles that are related but not entangled that are exactly 
in the same state in which entangled particles are (i.e., relata don’t fix relations).26  
In order to rebut 4.1 and 4.2 in a single stroke, it is sufficient to recall that in RQM there 
are no absolute states, and therefore also no quantum state of the universe: “Do observers O 
and [P] get the same answers out of a system S?’ is a meaningless question. It is a question 
about the absolute state of O and P. What is meaningful is to reformulate this question in 
                                                 
26 For an argument in favor of emergent properties of the whole, see Morganti (2009).  
 
 
 M. Dorato. Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics, monism and quantum becoming 
21 
 
terms of some observer.” (Rovelli 1997, p. 204). If S in this quotation is the whole universe, 
then it is meaningless to attribute it a definite state, even though it must be admitted, in full 
analogy with STR, that any separation between a part of the universe S and another part O is 
fully arbitrary or dictated by practical, non-theoretical considerations. But within QM, an 
important difference remains, due to the key assumption of RQM: the quantum universe S can 
be known only by interacting with parts of it from within, namely by partitioning it into two 
parts, one of which, O must be contained in S. 
A monist could reply by giving voice to the previously announced fifth criticism of 
RQM: the fact that RQM programmatically leaves unexplained how and why a superposed 
state becomes definite when an interaction takes place (the measurement problem, that is, how 
an “and” becomes an exclusive “or”) can incline one to the complaint that quantum theory as 
interpreted by RQM is, against Rovelli’s claim27, incomplete.  
There are three senses of “incomplete” that can be at work here and that must be 
disambiguated. The first corresponds to the assumption that no further progress in 
understanding quantum theory is forthcoming. This sense is out of question in this context, 
since no theory is immune from revisions, a point that Rovelli would surely grant. The second 
sense refers to “complete” as not needing “hidden variables” of some sort, in the sense of 
Bohmian mechanics, so that no explanation of the definiteness of quantum events constituting 
the product of interaction is needed. We have seen in what sense the primitiveness of the 
notion of interaction tries to solve the completeness of QM in this second sense. 
The third sense of incomplete that I am about to introduce is accepted also by RQM, 
and is highly relevant for quantum cosmology and the question of monism. It should be 
obvious why any interaction in principle presupposes a separation between two physical 
systems, S and O and this in turn presupposes the existence of two different systems, namely 
the existence of two parts. Now suppose as above that the observed system S is the whole 
universe, the One: since in this case O, the “observer”, is properly contained in S, the degrees 
of freedom or the states of the cosmos S are larger than those of any of its subsystems O (for 
this point, see Breuer 1995, pp. 206-7). In this case, Breuer explains how the states measured 
by O are self-referential, in that they are about the universe S but therefore also about O itself, 
qua proper subsystem of S. Therefore, for consistency reasons the restriction of the states of 
the universe S to O cannot be different from the states of O. This fact, together with what 
                                                 
27 “Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems relative to other systems, 
and this is a complete description of the world”. (Rovelli [1996], p. 7). 
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Breuer calls the proper inclusion requirement,28 logically implies that an internal observer O 
cannot measure exactly all the states of a system S in which it is included (Breuer 1995, p. 
207). It is in this sense (the third sense of incompleteness in question) that a self-measurement 
of O can never provide full information about S: an apparatus O cannot distinguish all the 
states of a system S containing O because two different states of S in O must coincide (Breuer 
1995, ibid.).  
In the quantum context Breuer’s proof implies that no quantum mechanical apparatus 
can measure all the EPR correlations between itself and a system S+O containing it. These 
correlations would only be measurable by an external observer P, interacting with both the 
system S and O; however, when S coincides with the whole universe, there cannot be any way 
to obtain an informationally complete measurement of the states of the universe.  
It might be rebutted that this still does not explain why a single outcome is obtained by 
O by interacting with an S smaller than the quantum universe. Against this reasonable 
complaint, we should note that often, in the main scientific revolutions characterizing the 
history of physics, the request for explanations drives away from scientific progress: in order 
to achieve the latter, one has to be able to identify the right question. Also in this case, as in 
other scientific revolutions, what needs to be explained changes radically with our change of 
theories (Kuhn 1962). Given this assumption, different interpretations of quantum theory 
depend on what one thinks is in need a physical explanation in terms of some causal 
mechanism. For instance, explaining why a body travelling in a certain direction with a 
certain speed tends to maintain its velocity has become an axiom of the modern mechanical 
view of the world, but for Aristotelian physics it was a problem crying out for an efficient-
cause type of explanation. Likewise for the attempts at giving a dynamical explanation for 
Lorentz contractions: now we accept a purely cinematic account of contractions and dilations, 
accompanied by structural explanations given in terms of the geometry of Minkowski 
spacetime. And in general relativity also the gravitational force/cause has been explained 
away in terms of the geometric notion of curvature. 
In sum, if S is the universe and O is contained in it, S can be described only from 
“within” (from one of its parts O), and in incomplete fashion. This entails that in order to 
describe the quantum universe, we must somehow consider all the possible compatible 
perspectives about it, each of which depends on a cut of the universe into two parts, a system 
and an observer. This fact has obvious consequences for priority monism as defended by 
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 This is roughly the idea that the universe S has more degrees of freedom than any of its subsystems P. 
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Schaffer, since the whole cannot have epistemic priority over the parts.29 Failure of ontic 
priority of the One follows from the fact that there is no consistent sum of all possible 
perspectives yielded by the parts, so that there is no definite One whose identity is non-
relational or non-structural.  
Reply to 4.3). Schaffer writes: "Now the argument from quantum entanglement to 
holism begins from the premise that the cosmos forms one vast entangled whole" (Schaffer 
2010, p. 52). Also this premise, which seems to follow from the fact that shortly after the Big 
Bang everything interacted with everything else, presupposes an observer external to the 
universe. However in RQM it does not make sense to claim that the whole universe is in a 
state of entanglement because, by being part of it, we cannot interact with it by definition! 
And since in RQM the state of a quantum system is a codification of outcomes of previous 
interactions, due to the impossibility of interacting with something of which we are a proper 
part, it does not make sense to claim that the universe is in an entangled state, but only that a 
part of it (maybe the largest part of it, but only relatively to the proper part O). If RQM is 
correct, it cannot be the case that all fundamental properties are properties of the cosmos (the 
One), (see also Sider 2007). 
 
5 RQM, quantum monism and relativistic becoming 
 
Another important field of confrontation between the monistic and the relational view of 
quantum mechanics concerns time and temporal becoming. Since time is important both in 
the world of quantum-relativistic physics and in our inner world, I assume that both views 
ought to provide some kind of explanation of our subjective sense of the passage of time. In 
the context of Relativistic Quantum Mechanics this task has proved rather difficult. Dorato 
(1995) has argued that as a consequence of quantum non-separability and of Stein’s theorem 
(1991), quantum becoming in Minkowski spacetime is ruled out. According to Albert (2000), 
no quantum theory at the moment provides an account of the world becoming in time. In 
order to defend quantum relativistic becoming in QM without a privileged frame, Myrvold 
(1993) has defended an hyperplane-dependent view of collapse.  
 In order to evaluate quantum monism and RQM vis a vis temporal becoming, I think 
                                                 
29 “I would like to raise this statement to the level of a fundamental principle, which we may call the Principle of 
the absurdity of the possibility of an outside observer.” (Smolin 1995, p.14)  
 M. Dorato. Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics, monism and quantum becoming 
24 
 
that the following three definitions are importantly neutral between the two views.  
DEF1 Absolute becoming. The claim that an event e “becomes” in an absolute sense (or 
“comes into existence”) at a certain time-place simply means that e occurs or happens at that 
time-place.30  
DEF2 the temporal becoming of a set of temporally separated (timelike-related) events 
consists in the fact that such events occur successively, or at different instants of proper time.  
DEF3 the spatial becoming of a set of spatially separated (spacelike-related) events consists 
in the fact that such events occur at different locations in spacelike related regions.  
If we assume that an interpretation of QM that were to rule out the notion of becoming 
ought to be regarded as unsatisfactory, then we can easily conclude that Schaffer’s quantum 
monism is bound to commit itself to cosmic time, with all the difficulties involved in this 
notion (Belot 2005, Dieks 2006). On the contrary, RQM is very hospital to an objective but 
local temporal becoming, for which we need three ingredients: 1) Events, regarded as local 
causal nodes in a relational network; 2) Local succession of events on a worldline, or 
processes; 3) A de facto irreversible succession. As I am about to show, these three ingredients 
are (either implicitly or explicity) present in RQM.31 
Clearly, and firstly, RQM has events as well-defined spatiotemporal extended entities in 
a relational causal network: events in RQM are the by-product of the interactions between S’s 
and O’s, the beables of the theory. Secondly, succession of measurements realized by the same 
system O in interacting either with the same system S or with other systems S’, S’’, etc. 
provides time with an objective although local and worldline-dependent arrow of time given 
by the successive coming into existence or actualization or simply becoming of events. 
Thirdly, RQM is compatible with (or even forces us to) claiming that a system S manifests its 
dispositions to display value q relatively to the observing system O: the manifestation in 
question ought to be regarded as de facto irreversible, otherwise no stable measurement would 
be available. The time-asymmetric dispositionalist language defended above is suitable to 
express this sort of irreversibility, since the manifestation of a disposition is a time-
asymmetric process. Finally, as already argued by Savitt (2001), Dorato (2006) and Dieks 
(2006), this type of becoming is relational and strictly local, where local means not extendible 
to other worldlines of other observers or unanimated physical systems.  
In a word, and as Stein had already noted, becoming is compatible with special 
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 This first approach to absolute becoming has recently defended by various scholars, but is originally offered in 
Broad (1933/38). The other two definitions are in Dorato (2006). 
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 Even though, possibly, not just in RQM but also in dynamical collapse models. 
 M. Dorato. Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics, monism and quantum becoming 
25 
 
relativity. What is relevant here is that we don’t need to read QM as presupposing a privileged 
frame of reference (Albert 2000) as in Bohmian mechanics, and we don’t need to have a 
frame-dependent notion of relativistic becoming, as proposed by Myrvold (2003) in order to 
take quantum non-separability and frame-dependent localizations into account.
32
 The kind of 
becoming obtained within RQM is compatible with the relativistic constraints of being non 
spacelike, but only timelike or lightlike (Savitt 2002, Dieks 2006, Dorato 2006). 
However, if the whole set of events (Minkowski spacetime) constituting a classical 
spacetime were metaphysically and epistemically prior as priority monism would impose, it 
would be hard to provide a notion of cosmic becoming, the more so when we go to the curved 
manifolds of general relativity. If holism prevailed, we would not have becoming, not even in 
the minimal sense, because the notion of cosmic time is not robust enough to give us cosmic 
becoming. 
From the perspective of single worldlines of observers, instead, we can have a 
description of the successive stages of physical systems, the quantum universe (possibly) 
included. In the form of relativistic becoming endorsed by RQM what we have is a criss-
crossing of little ripples, unrelated to each other, which give us local, non-worldwide 
becoming (corresponding to the incomplete information that each observer has about the 
universe, given that she is inside it). The fact that in RQM we have no universal and cosmic 
tide of becoming also corresponds to the locality of RQM: of the distant wing of a Bell-type 
experiment, nothing can be concluded, until a concrete correlation with it is established 
(Laudisa 2001, Rovelli and Smerlack 2007).  
To conclude, Rovelli’s pluralistic and perspectivalist view of QM can be summarized in 
the following, striking quotation: “if we want to get a true idea of what a point of space-time 
is like we should look outward at the universe…The complete notion of a point of space-time 
in fact consists of the appearance of the entire universe as seen from that point.” (Barbour 
1982, p. 265). The determination between a subsystem of the universe and the universe itself 
is perfectly symmetrical: it is true that the nature of such a local subsystem (“space-time 
point”) depends on the way it interacts with, or “reflects”, the universe from its particular 
perspective (and this seems a partial concession to monism), but in RQM there is no 
Leibnizian “monad of the monads”, because the cosmos can only be described from some 
local physical system. The problem with priority monism is that it concentrates exclusively on 
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 A frame-dependent sort of becoming cannot be regarded as an account of a Minkowski universe becoming in 
time, of course, since there are as many histories as there are frames of reference. 
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the dependence of the part from the whole, neglecting completely the converse type of 
dependence. 
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